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Abstract
Background: The preferences of Iranians concerning the attributes of health insurance benefit packages are not well 
studied. This study aimed to elicit health insurance preferences among insured people in Iran during 2016.
Methods: A mixed methods study using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) approach was conducted to elicit health 
insurance preferences on a total sample of 600 insured Iranians residing in Tehran. The final design of the DCE included 
8 health insurance attributes. Data were analyzed using conditional logistic regression models.
Results: The final model of this DCE study included 8 attributes, and the findings indicated statistically significant 
(P < .001) increase in the odds ratio (OR) of choosing health insurance at all levels of cost coverage except for the 
rehabilitation and para-clinical benefits, where at 70% cost coverage there was insignificant (P = .485) disutility 
(OR = 0.95). With the increase in cost coverage level, the probability of choosing health insurance was significantly 
(P < .001) the highest for the private hospitals’ benefits (OR = 2.82) followed by public hospitals’ benefits (OR = 2.02) 
and outpatient benefits (OR = 1.75), and the premium revealed statistically significant (P < .001) disutility (OR = 0.96). 
Conclusion: Our findings revealed that participants would be willing to choose health insurance plans with higher cost 
coverage of healthcare services and with lower premiums. However, the demographic characteristics, income, and health 
status of the insured individuals affected their health insurance preferences. The findings can contribute to the design of 
better health insurance policies, improve the participation of individuals in health insurance, and increase the insured 
individuals’ utility from the insurance benefits packages.
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Implications for policy makers
• Generally, the participants are willing to choose health insurance plans with higher cost coverage of healthcare services and with lower premiums.
• The private hospitals’ benefits followed by the public hospitals’ benefits provided the highest utility for all sub-categories of the insured 
respondents than the other attributes. 
• The cost coverage of the dental services, long-term care, and para-clinical and rehabilitation services provided the lower utilities for the 
participants. 
Implications for the public
Evidence concerning health insurance preferences of the insured people is useful for improving and designing better benefits packages. Health 
insurance with a higher cost coverage of the public and private hospitals’ (inpatient) and outpatient services benefits can provide more utility to 
people. The service users might consider the insurance for the health benefits packages such as dental care as less important. Thus, providing them 
with the opportunity for more options for basic benefits packages could have increased their utilities.
Key Messages 
Introduction
Health insurance is one of the financing mechanisms in 
health. Most countries use different ways of health insurance 
to reduce uncertainty in health expenditures by collecting 
predictable premiums from members.1 Health insurance has 
a considerably high positive effect on social protection and 
economic development, especially to vulnerable people such 
as the poor and rural residents.2 
Article 29 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
states that all Iranians should have health insurance coverage. 
Public participation and revenues collected from the public 
are among the vital sources of financing the healthcare. Other 
main financing sources included health insurance payments 
and out of pocket payments. Generally, the Iranian health 
system is dominantly an insurance-based system.3
There is a mix of public and private health insurance 
schemes in the Iranian health system. However, the Social 
Security Insurance Organization (SSIO), and the Health 
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Insurance Organization (HIO) formerly called the Medical 
Insurance Organization are the main ones. The Armed Forces 
Medical Services Insurance Organization, and the Imdad 
Committee Health Insurance are also other schemes that cover 
health insurance for the military and the poor, respectively.3 
In 2013, the SSIO insured about 39 million people. This figure 
has increased to more than 42 million people in 2017, out of 
which about 8 million of them resided in Tehran province.4 
Again, the HIO has insured another more than 32 million 
people in 2018.5 
The healthcare financing challenges and the poor design 
of the insurance schemes are among the main issues that 
constrained the successful financial protection and service 
delivery in Iran. The insurance schemes that are designed 
based on diseases by ignoring the health, pricing, definition 
of tariffs, and benefits packages are not evidence-based.6 
The designing of health insurance schemes should consider 
peoples’ preferences. The discrete choice experiment (DCE) 
method is a suitable method to assess peoples’ health 
insurance preferences. This method, for example, has been 
used to generate evidence concerning the Dutch peoples’ 
preferences among the different health insurance plans,7 and 
to elicit the health insurance preferences of different groups of 
people in Thailand.8,9 
The demand for health insurance largely depends on 
its ability to meet the consumer’s needs, expectations and 
preferences.9,10 To the best of our knowledge, little evidence 
is available concerning the health insurance preferences of 
the Iranians. This study aimed to elicit the health insurance 
preferences of Iranians residing in Tehran using the DCE 
method. The findings are of paramount importance inputs 
for health insurance policy making and to provide people 
with health insurance benefits packages that incorporate their 
preferences in the context of Iran and perhaps beyond. 
Methods
Study Area
Iran is one of the middle-income countries with a total 
population of about 80 million people for the year 2016 and 
spent about 6.9% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health 
in 2014.11 The health system has both the private and public 
sectors. The public sector is responsible for the provision of 
primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare services, while 
the private sector provides secondary and tertiary services.12 
Most of the secondary and tertiary healthcare services are 
under the coverage of health insurance. However, the services 
users have to pay coinsurance payments at the point of service 
delivery. These payments are higher in the private sector 
because the tariff is higher in the private sector than in the 
public one. The individuals with no health insurance coverage 
should pay all the charges, especially when they obtain the 
services from the private sector.13 
About three-fourth (74.4%) of the Iranians are urban 
residents.4 In 2010, around 16% of the urban population 
did not have any health insurance coverage.14 In April 2014, 
the health sector evolution plan of Iran introduced a health 
insurance scheme to remove the financial barriers of access 
to healthcare services. This plan provided health insurance 
coverage for people who have no health insurance coverage 
by the HIO through the government’s financial support. For 
those who cannot afford the cost of health insurance, the 
premium was free. This intervention increased the coverage 
of health insurance in the country.15 The compulsory health 
insurance is the means to cover the rural residents and almost 
do not pay any premium.16 This study focused on the insured 
Iranians residing in Tehran, the capital of Iran, during 2016.
Experimental Design
We applied a mixed methods study using a DCE to elicit health 
insurance preferences among the insured Iranians living in 
Tehran. This study involved 4 stages of the DCE method.17-19 
Initially, we determined the attributes and attribute-levels 
from a list obtained by narrative reviews and interviews of nine 
experts. Reviewing literature, and interviewing of groups such 
as experts, and study population or a mix of these methods 
is a regular practice to determining the attributes in  DCE 
studies. Thus, we performed review of literature and experts’ 
interview to extract the preliminary list of health insurance 
attributes. Then, 36 experts assessed the list and identified 
8 eligible ones. The details of the attributes and attributes-
levels are available elsewhere.20 The D-efficiency criteria 
have been used to design the choice set and select the most 
efficient attributes to be included in the final experimental 
design.19 The final design contained 24 choice set divided into 
3 blocks. Each block had 8 choice set which again consisted of 
plans A and B. The experimental design of the choice set was 
performed using the SAS version 9.1. 
We designed a questionnaire that consisted of 3 sections: 
the description of the research and informed consent, the 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the 
participants, and 3 blocks of 8 choice set. Therefore, we 
developed 3 versions of the questionnaire that were different 
only in the choice set (blocks). The participants were explained 
about the included attributes before proceeding the tasks, and 
the dominant choice set was used to test for consistency of 
the questions and to warm up the participants. In this phase, 
we excluded the participants who missed the correct answer 
to the dominant choice set. We used the experts’ opinion 
to validate and piloted the questionnaire. Each block of the 
choice set was pilot tested on 15 insured participants from the 
study area to ensuring the reliability and internal consistency 
of the tool. The pilot data were excluded from the analysis. 
Two trained data collectors obtained the data for the final 
analysis using an interview method. The research team has 
performed regular supervision to ensure the quality of the 
collected data. The attributes and attribute-levels of the health 
insurance in Iran and the choice set included in the analysis 
of our study are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
Sample Size
Determining the sample size of the DCE study is complex. 
Some suggest at least 30 participants for each subgroup such 
as age, gender, etc.17 Others recommend a threshold of 1000,16 
and yet other researchers suggested a minimum of 500 to 
ensure  the precision of the findings. Our study considered a 
threshold of 1000 and the sample size was calculated using the 
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following formula21:
ntaS
c
=                                                                                        (1)
Where S represents the sample size, n is the total number 
of respondents, t is the total number of choice sets in the 
questionnaire, a is the number of alternatives in the choice 
sets, and c is the highest number of levels in the final attributes. 
The sample size in this study was 600 participants.
Sampling Technique
Initially, we grouped the 22 municipalities in Tehran into 5 
homogeneous clusters. Then, we selected one municipality 
from each cluster and a branch each from the SSIO and 
the HIO operating in that municipality randomly. Finally, 
we applied the proportionate allocation to population size 
technique to determine the sample size needed from each 
agency and selected the insured individuals using a systematic 
random sampling technique. 
Data Analysis 
The random utility theory was the basis for the analysis of 
the DCEs data. Accordingly, consider that a person should 
choose between 2 alternatives A or B, and chose A. This 
indicates that alternative A provides more utility to the person 
than alternative B, and can be mathematically expressed as 
follows.22
 U (A, C) > U (B, C)                                                                    (2)
Where U is the utility derived from each alternative A and 
B, and C is a personal attribute which becomes effective upon 
choosing the alternative. As C is a common element both 
sides of equation 2, alternatively equation 2 can be expressed 
as follow:
V (A-B) = U (A, C) - U (B, C)                                                 (3)
Where V is indirect utility obtained from the alternative 
A compared with alternative B. The fitted utility function is 
expressed using a linear equation as follows:
V=β1Pubh + β2Prih + β3Outp + β4Dent + β5Rep + β6Lt+ β7Md 
+ β8Prem + ɛ                                                                              (4)
Where β1 to β8 are the coefficients of the benefit packages, 
and the attributes: Pubh (public hospitals benefits), Prich 
(private hospitals benefits), Outp (Outpatient benefits), 
Dent (dental coverage), Rep (rehabilitation and Para-clinical 
benefits), Lt (long-term care), Md (benefits for medical 
devices), and Prem (Premium) included in the analysis, and Ɛ 
is the error term. Assuming that the error terms have Logistic 
distribution, we applied the conditional logit regression 
model to analyze the data.23 This model assumes that the 
choices made are independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
which may be restrictive. Meanwhile, it is more useful to 
estimate the utility obtained from an attribute than using the 
more complicated models such as the nested logit and mixed 
logit models.24 The positive (negative) β coefficient indicates 
an individual’s utility (disutility) from the use of the chosen 
attribute. The McFadden R2 and χ2 tests were used to examine 
the goodness of fit of the models. We used the statistical 
software packages SAS 9.1 and Stata 13 (StataCorp, College 
Station, TX, USA) to perform the analysis. 
Results
Attributes and Levels
The benefits from the public hospital services, private 
hospital services, outpatient services, dental care coverage, 
rehabilitation and para-clinical services, long-term care, 
medical devices (eg, Ortez, Protez, etc), and the health 
insurance premium were the attributes included in the final 
design. The service cost coverage levels for the private hospital 
benefits, outpatient benefits, rehabilitation and para-clinical 
therapy benefits, and long-term care benefits were 50%, 70%, 
and 90%, respectively. The base and service cost coverage
levels for the dental care were 40% and 70%, while for the 
public hospital benefits and the medical devices benefits the 
base and levels were 60% and 90%, respectively. The premium 
levels were 250 000, 350 000, and 450 000 Iranian Rials (IRRs), 
respectively. Each US dollar was equal to 32000 IRRs in the 
time of the study. The public hospitals were affiliated to 
medical universities under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Health and Medical Education, while the private hospitals 
provide services and owned by private health sector.
Descriptive Statistics of Participants
Out of the total 600 study participants, males accounted for 
Table 1. Attributes and Attribute-Levels of the Health Insurance in Iran
Attributes Levels
Public hospitals benefits Coverage of 60/90% of costs 
Private hospitals benefits Coverage of 50/70/90% of costs
Outpatient benefits Coverage of 50/70/90% of costs
Dental care coverage benefits Coverage of 40/70% of costs
Rehabilitation and para-clinical benefits Coverage of 50/70/90% of costs 
Long-term care benefits Coverage of 50/70/90% of costs
Medical devices benefits Coverage of 60/90% of costs
Premium 250 000/350 000/450 000 Rials 
Table 2. One of the Choice Set Included in the Study
Attributes Plan A Plan B
Public hospitals benefits (cost coverage) 60% 90% 
Private hospitals benefits (cost coverage) 90% 50% 
Outpatient benefits (cost coverage) 70% 90% 
Dental coverage (cost coverage) 40% 40% 
Rehabilitation and para-clinical benefits (cost 
coverage)
70% 70%
Long-term care (cost coverage) 50% 70% 
Benefits for medical devices (cost coverage) 60% 90% 
Premium (IRRs) 450 000 350 000 
Which of the health insurance plans would you like to choose (Please tick 
one box only)?                                           Plan A                              Plan B 
Kazemi Karyani et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(8), 488–497 491
327 (54.5%) (Table 3). The mean age was 41.48 ± SD = 14.67 
years. Those participants with above 12 years of schooling 
accounted for 45.17%. Furthermore, 36.16% of the male 
and 16.50% of the female participants were employed, while 
15.83% of the overall participants were retired. Again, 76% 
and 28% of the total study participants were male and female 
household heads, respectively. The monthly income for 41% 
of the households was less than twenty million IRRs, while for 
31.5% it was 21 to 40 million IRRs. About 75% of participants 
had social security insurance, and 56.33% of participants had 
one or more chronic diseases.
Preferences About Health Insurance
The regression analysis revealed statistically significant 
(P ≤ .001) associations between increasing the cost of coverage 
levels and the probability of choosing the health insurance 
for all the attributes except for the 70% coverage level for the 
rehabilitation and para-clinical benefit which was insignificant 
(P = .485). Increasing the cost coverage level from 50% to 90% 
significantly (P < .001) increased the odds of choosing the 
health insurance for the private hospital benefits more than 
twice (odds ratio [OR] = 2.82). Increasing the cost coverage 
level for the public hospital benefits from 60% to 90% also 
increased the probability of choosing health insurance for the 
public hospital benefits by about twice (Table 4).
Subgroup Analysis
Preferences by Gender: The findings revealed that both males 
and females had higher utilities from the inpatient and 
outpatient benefits than from the other attributes. At 70% 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Insured Study Participants in Tehran, Iran; 2016
Variables
Male Female Total
No. (%a) No. (%a) No. (%a)
Age
41 and younger 175 (29.17) 160 (26.67) 335 (55.83)
Older than 41 152 (25.33) 113 (18.83) 265 (44.17)
Education level (years of schooling)
Low educated (≤ 12) 188 (31.33) 141 (23.50) 329 (54.83)
High educated (>12) 139 (23.17) 132 (22.00) 271 (45.17)
Head of household
Yes 248 (41.33) 52 (8.67) 300 (50.00)
No 79 (13.17) 221 (36.83) 300 (50.00)
Household income (in million IRRs)
≤ 20 156 (26.00) 150 (25.00) 306 (51.00)
21-40 110 (18.33) 79 (13.17) 189 (31.50)
>40 61 (10.17) 44 (7.33) 105 (17.50)
Type of basic health insurance
SSIO 249 (41.50) 206 (34.33) 455 (75.83)
Others (HIO, etc) 78 (13.00) 67 (11.17) 145 (24.17)
Chronic condition (s)
Yes 175 (29.17) 163 (27.17) 338 (56.33)
No 152 (25.33) 110 (18.33) 262 (43.67)
Overall total 327 (54.50) 273 (45.50) 600 (100.00)
Abbreviations: SSIO, social security insurance organization; HIO, health insurance organization.
a Percentage for all the cells was calculated from total participants  (dominator equals to 600).
Table 4. Regression Model Eliciting Preferences of Attributes of Health Insurance
Attributes Cost Coverage β SE P Value OR
Public hospitals benefits (base: 60%) 90%  0.705 0.036 <.001 2.023
Private hospitals benefits (base: 50%)
70%  0.585 0.053 <.001 1.795
90%  1.040 0.055 <.001 2.824
Outpatient benefits (base: 50%)
70%  0.270 0.050 <.001 1.310
90%  0.561 0.052 <.001 1.753
Dental coverage (base: 40%) 70%  0.451 0.078 <.001 1.570
Rehabilitation and para-clinical benefits (base: 50%)
70% -0.047 0.067   .485 0.954
90%  0.484 0.058 <.001 1.622
Long-term care benefits (base: 50%)
70%  0.259 0.074 <.001 1.306
90%  0.356 0.076 <.001 1.428
Medical devices benefits (base: 60%) 90%  0.209 0.057 <.001 1.232
Premium (per 10 000 IRRs) - -0.036 0.004 <.001 0.965
Observation 9600
McFadden's R2 0.19
Log likelihood -2695
LR chi2(12) 1263
Prob > chi2 <0.001
Abbreviations: SE, standard error; OR, odds ratio.
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cost coverage for the rehabilitation and para-clinical benefits, 
females had disutility (OR = 0.86), and males had some utility 
(OR = 1.04). The public hospitals’ benefits at 90% cost coverage 
provided relatively a higher utility for males than for females 
(OR: 2.23 vs. 1.81), while females had considerably higher 
utility from the private hospitals’ benefits than males (OR: 
3.15 vs. 2.58). Both males and females showed an increase 
in the utility from the outpatient benefits with an increase in 
cost coverage (Table 5). 
Preferences by age: The cost coverage of the inpatient 
services resulted in the highest utility for both age groups. The 
coefficient of the public hospitals’ benefits for those whose 
age was 41 years and younger (OR = 1.98) and for those over 
the age of 41 years (OR = 2.10) were nearly equal, while the 
utility from the private hospital benefits at 70% and 90% cost 
coverage were higher for the younger age group.
The younger age group had higher utilities of the outpatient 
and dental services than their counterpart. In contrast, the 
older age group’s utility level of long-term care benefits was 
relatively higher (Table 5). At 70% cost coverage, both age 
groups had statistically insignificant (P > .05) disutility of 
the rehabilitation and para-clinical benefits. However, the 
older and younger age groups showed about an equal level 
of disutility of the premium (OR =  0.97 vs. 0.96). At 70% cost 
coverage, all the attributes except for the rehabilitation and 
para-clinical benefits were statistically significant (P < .05). 
Preferences by educational level: The lower educated group 
had relatively a higher utility of the public hospitals’ benefits 
than the higher educated group (OR = 2.15 vs. 1.88). The 
utility level from all the attributes except the long-term care 
was higher for the higher educated group than for the lower 
educated one (Table 5). Both groups had higher differences 
in the level of utilities from the private hospitals’ benefits 
and dental benefits than in the other attributes. At 90% cost 
coverage, the higher educated had a higher utility level of the 
private hospital benefits than the lower educated group (OR = 
3.67 vs. 2.31). Nevertheless, the more educated group’s utility 
level of the dental benefits was higher than the lower educated 
one (OR = 2.01 vs. 1.32). 
Preferences of household head: The heads of the households 
had more utility from the coverage of the costs. For example, 
at 90% cost coverage the households’ heads had a higher 
utility of the public hospitals’ benefits than the non-head 
households’ utility (OR = 2.20 vs. 1.87), while the heads of 
the households had a lower utility of the private hospitals’ 
benefits than the non-head households (OR = 2.40 vs. 3.34). 
At 70% cost coverage for the dental services, the non-
heads category of households had a higher utility than the 
household heads category (OR = 1.71 vs. 1.45), while both the 
head and non-head household groups had disutility from the 
rehabilitation and para-clinical services (OR = 0.98 vs. 0.93). 
The disutilities from the premium for both groups (OR = 0.96 
vs. 0.97) were almost equal (Table 6).
Preferences by income: The findings indicated a positive 
association between the utility of most of the attributes and 
the participants’ monthly income. At 90% cost coverage, those 
with a monthly income of more than 40 million IRRs had the 
highest utility of the private hospitals’ benefits (OR = 3.69) 
than those in the other income categories. In contrast, while 
those with a monthly income of fewer or equal to 20 million 
IRRs had the highest utility of the public hospitals’ benefits 
(OR = 2.26). Again, those with a monthly income of fewer or 
equal to 20 million IRRs showed an increased likelihood of 
utility of the outpatient services from OR = 1.21 to OR = 1.83 
with an increase in cost coverage from 70% to 90%.
The disutilities from the para-clinical and rehabilitation 
services and the premium was almost equal for all the income 
groups. That is, the premium showed less sensitivity to the 
income of the individuals. The utilities of the participants 
in the low and middle-income groups at 70% cost coverage 
for the para-clinical and rehabilitation and the high-income 
people with the long-term care at the same level of cost 
coverage were statistically insignificant (P > .05). 
Preferences by health status: Both the healthy individuals 
and individuals with chronic diseases had higher utilities 
from public and private hospitals benefits (inpatient services) 
than the utilities obtained from the other attributes. The 
probability of utilities from the public inpatient services 
among the patient group (OR = 2.12) and healthy group 
(OR = 1.92) showed slight difference. However, the healthy 
group had a higher utility from the private inpatient services 
at 90% cost coverage than the patient group (OR = 3.03 vs. 
2.67). Both the healthy and patient groups had almost equal 
utility from the outpatient services (OR = 1.82 vs. 1.72), and 
rehabilitation and para-clinical services (OR = 1.68 vs. 1.58), 
while the patient group had a higher utility from long-term 
care than the healthy group (OR = 1.63 vs. 1.21). 
Discussion
This study elicited the insured Iranians’ preferences about 
the different attributes of health insurance plans in Iran. Our 
findings revealed an increase in utility related to the increase 
in cost coverage for all the attributes analyzed, and the highest 
utility from the private hospitals’ benefits followed by the 
public hospitals’ benefits, and outpatient benefits, respectively. 
The quality of private healthcare services in Iran is assumed 
to be better than public healthcare services.25 The utility of 
cost coverage of private inpatient services was higher than 
the public hospitals’ services. However, the households’ heads 
had a higher utility from the public hospital benefits. Others 
reported a higher utility of the less educated from the public 
hospital benefits and disutility of the higher premium.26 Also, 
the high expenditure of the households’ heads was one of 
the main reasons for the lower utility from private hospital 
benefits.27 The utilization of private hospital services was also 
associated with a higher probability of incurring catastrophic 
health expenditures (CHEs).28
Others reported the likely more preferences to both the 
public and private providers than to one of the providers alone.8 
The individuals’ higher preferences to the private than to the 
public hospitals’ benefits at the 90% cost coverage observed 
in our study may imply better quality services of the private 
providers. Also, the utility from the use of private services was 
higher among high-income households, and the high hospital 
admission rate in Iran might reflect the higher socioeconomic 
status of those individuals with the admission need. That is, 
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Table 5. Health Insurance Attributes Preferences of Participants by Gender, Age, and Educational Level in Tehran, Iran; 2016
Attributes
Cost 
Coverage
Gender Age Group (y) Educational Level
Male Female 41 And Younger Older Than 41 Lower Educated Higher Educated
β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR
Public hospitals benefits (base: 60%) 90% 0.801 (0.049)a 2.228 0.594 (0.053)a 1.811 0.683 (0.048)a 1.980 0.742 (0.054)a 2.100 0.768 (0.049)a 2.155 0.634 (0.054)a 1.885
Private hospitals benefits (base: 50%)
70% 0.542 (0.073)a 1.719 0.633 (0.078)a 1.883 0.665 (0.072)a 1.944 0.489 (0.080)a 1.631 0.467 (0.071)a 1.595 0.752 (0.081)a 2.121
90% 0.949 (0.075)a 2.583 1.146 (0.084)a 3.146 1.145 (0.076)a 3.142 0.914 (0.083)a 2.494 0.838 (0.075)a 2.312 1.300 (0.085)a 3.669
Outpatient benefits (base: 50%)
70% 0.311 (0.069)a 1.365 0.230 (0.075)b 1.259 0.339 (0.068)a 1.404 0.193 (0.075)c 1.213 0.231 (0.067)a 1.260 0.339 (0.077)a 1.404
90% 0.571 (0.073)a 1.770 0.558 (0.077)a 1.747 0.674 (0.070)a 1.962 0.415 (0.08)a 1.514 0.537 (0.071)b 1.711 0.594 (0.079)a 1.811
Dental coverage (base: 40%) 70% 0.414 (0.106)a 1.513 0.500 (0.119)a 1.649 0.575 (0.107)a 1.777 0.289 (0.119)c 1.335 0.281 (0.105)a 1.324 0.699 (0.122)a 2.012
Rehabilitation and para-clinical 
benefits (base: 50%)
70% 0.04 (0.091) 1.041 -0.148 (0.100) 0.862 -0.058 (0.090) 0.944 -0.017 (0.102) 0.983 -0.002 (0.090) 0.998 -0.118 (0.102) 0.889
90% 0.491 (0.081)a 1.634 0.480 (0.089)a 1.616 0.469 (0.081)a 1.598 0.502 (0.089)a 1.652 0.406 (0.081)a 1.501 0.571 (0.089)a 1.770
Long-term care benefits (base: 50%)
70% 0.244 (0.102)c 1.276 0.273 (0.111)b 1.314 0.121 (0.100) 1.129 0.474 (0.115)a 1.606 0.296 (0.102)b 1.344 0.23 (0.112)c 1.259
90% 0.377 (0.105)a 1.458 0.348 (0.114)b 1.416 0.188 (0.103) 1.207 0.613 (0.117)a 1.846 0.389 (0.104)a 1.476 0.349 (0.116)b 1.418
Medical devices benefits (base: 60%) 90% 0.162 (0.070)c 1.176 0.264 (0.074)a 1.302 0.235 (0.067)a 1.265 0.169 (0.078) 1.184 0.209 (0.070)b 1.232 0.209 (0.075)b 1.232
Premium (per 10 000 IRRs) - -0.033 (0.005)a 0.968 -0.040 (0.005)a 0.961 -0.033 (0.005)a 0.968 -0.039 (0.005)a 0.962 -0.042 (0.005)a 0.959 -0.029 (0.005)a 0.971
Observations 5232 4368 5360 4240 5264 4336
McFadden's R2 0.1907 0.196 0.192 0.197 0.185 0.21
Log likelihood -1467 -1216 -1501 -1180 -1486 -1186
LR chi2(12) 691 593 713 580 675 632
Prob > chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Abbreviations: SE, standard error; OR, odds ratio.
a P < .00, b P < .01, c P < .05
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Table 6. Health Insurance Attributes Preferences of Participants by Status in Household, Income, and Health in Tehran, Iran; 2016
Attributes
Cost 
Coverage
Status in Household Household Income (Monthly) Health Status
Head of Household Non-head Household < 20 Million Rials 20-40 Million Rials > 40 Million Rials
Have a Chronic 
Condition(s)
Healthy
β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR
Public hospitals benefits (base: 60%) 90% 0.786 (0.051)a 2.195 0.627 (0.051)a 1.872 0.816 (0.052)a 2.261 0.628 (0.064)a 1.874 0.549 (0.085)a 1.732 0.749 (0.049)a 2.115 0.653 (0.053)a 1.921
Private hospitals benefits (base: 
50%)
70% 0.487 (0.075)a 1.627 0.685 (0.076)a 1.984 0.512 (0.076)a 1.669 0.643 (0.093)a 1.902 0.764 (0.132)a 2.147 0.522 (0.071)a 1.685 0.67 (0.081)a 1.954
90% 0.875 (0.078)a 2.399 1.207 (0.081)a 3.343 0.905 (0.080)a 2.472 1.145 (0.099)c 3.142 1.307 (0.133)a 3.695 0.984 (0.075)a 2.675 1.11 (0.084)a 3.034
Outpatient benefits (base: 50%)
70% 0.344 (0.071)a 1.411 0.200 (0.072)b 1.221 0.192 (0.071)b 1.212 0.35 (0.090)a 1.419 0.401 (0.124)a 1.493 0.259 (0.067)a 1.296 0.291 (0.076)a 1.338
90% 0.552 (0.076)a 1.737 0.571 (0.073)a 1.770 0.606 (0.074)a 1.833 0.563 (0.093)a 1.756 0.46 (0.129)a 1.584 0.540 (0.072)a 1.716 0.596 (0.077)a 1.815
Dental coverage benefits (base: 40%) 70% 0.368 (0.111)b 1.445 0.539 (0.113)a 1.714 0.388 (0.110)a 1.474 0.399 (0.142)b 1.490 0.781 (0.201)a 2.184 0.463 (0.105)a 1.589 0.438 (0.12)a 1.550
Rehabilitation and para-clinical 
benefits (base: 50%)
70% -0.017 (0.095) 0.983 -0.077 (0.096) 0.926 -0.039 (0.095) 0.962 -0.070 (0.119) 0.932 -0.039 (0.166) 0.962 -0.062 (0.091) 0.940 -0.028 (0.1) 0.972
90% 0.474 (0.084)a 1.606 0.491 (0.085)a 1.634 0.458 (0.085)a 1.581 0.512 (0.106)a 1.669 0.538 (0.14)b 1.713 0.458 (0.081)a 1.581 0.521 (0.088)a 1.684
Long-term care benefits (base: 50%)
70% 0.353 (0.107)b 1.423 0.178 (0.106)b 1.195 0.226 (0.106)a 1.254 0.177 (0.136) 1.194 0.538 (0.176) 1.713 0.378 (0.102)a 1.459 0.110 (0.111) 1.116
90% 0.446 (0.109)a 1.562 0.292 (0.109)b 1.339 0.282 (0.109)c 1.326 0.361 (0.135)b 1.435 0.631 (0.191)b 1.879 0.489 (0.104)a 1.631 0.190 (0.114) 1.209
Medical devices benefits (base: 60%) 90% 0.193 (0.073)b 1.213 0.222 (0.071)b 1.249 0.245 (0.073)a 1.278 0.220 (0.089)c 1.246 0.121 (0.122)b 1.129 0.262 (0.07)a 1.300 0.136 (0.074) 1.146
Premium (per 10 000 IRRs) - -0.038 (0.005)a 0.963 -0.034 (0.005)a 0.967 -0.041 (0.005)a 0.960 -0.037 (0.006)a 0.964 -0.021 (0.008)a 0.979 -0.039 (0.005)a 0.962 -0.031 (0.005)a 0.969
Observations 193 0.195 4896 3024 1680 5408 4192
McFadden's R2 -1342 -1338 0.199 0.195 0.198 0.195 0.18
Log likelihood 643 649 -1358 -843 -466 -1496 -1191
LR chi2(12) <0.001 <0.001 679 409 231 755 522
Prob > chi2 2785 2779 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Abbreviations: SE, standard error; OR, odds ratio.
a P < .00, b P < .01, c P < .05
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people with higher socioeconomic status are likely to have 
better access to healthcare in general, and inpatient services 
in particular. The difference in health insurance coverage 
might be one of the main reasons for such variations.29 Thus, 
improving health insurance coverage increases the utilization 
of healthcare services.29-31 A study in Ethiopia also revealed 
peoples’ preference for health insurance packages with access 
to both the public and private providers.32 
Gender of the insured participants was one of the main 
factors which affected preference. At the highest level of cost 
coverage, the males’ preference for public hospitals’ benefits 
was considerably higher than that of the females,’ while at the 
same rate of cost coverage, females had a markedly higher 
preference for the private hospitals’ benefits than the males do. 
Nevertheless, the disutility of both genders from the premium 
was almost the same. Evidence revealed a higher preference of 
women for outpatient services and men for inpatient services. 
Like in ours, the disutility from the premium was the same for 
both men and women.26
The findings also revealed an age difference in utilities 
of the health insurance benefits. The younger individuals’ 
utilities from the coverage of the private hospitals’ benefits, 
outpatient and dental coverage benefits were higher than the 
utilities of the older ones. The impact of age on household 
choice for insurance is found to be non-linear and U-shaped.33 
The older individuals in our findings revealed a higher utility 
from the long-term benefits than their counterpart, which 
might be due to the occurrence of aging-related chronic 
diseases.34 In Japan’s public sector, the provision of mandatory 
long-term care insurance was in place since 2000 to ensure 
better accessibility of healthcare services to the elderly and 
reduce the healthcare-related burden on the families of the 
elderly. However, its sustainability was challenging because 
of financial constraints.35 The premium of the available 
small private market for long-term health insurance was also 
expensive compared to its benefits.36 Again, those who have 
more coverage were likely to frequently utilize more medical 
services than those with less coverage.37 Thus, income is one of 
the main factors which determine health insurance preference 
of health expenditures of people.38 Our findings indicated the 
odds of choosing health insurance with more cost coverage 
among the higher income groups, which is consistent with 
the findings which reported wealthier individuals are more 
likely to seek and prefer for the private than public medical 
services.39 
The findings indicated a higher utility from the dental 
services with higher cost coverage and the more preference 
for the dental care benefits insurance coverage among the 
more educated individuals. Similarly, a study in Namibia 
reported an association between educational status and health 
insurance,40 and an association between more dental health-
care services utilization and several factors including aging, 
having dental insurance, higher income, being a university 
graduate, self-rated poor oral health and not regularly 
brushing own teeth.41 In Iran, there are different sources for 
the insurance of the health benefits packages.42 Thus, the high 
complementary health insurance coverage (>35%) observed 
in our findings might inform the uniform provision of social 
insurance benefits and the lack of diversity of the benefits 
packages to the citizens. This condition might have resulted 
from the influence of the individuals’ decisions in purchasing 
the health insurance benefit packages by several factors 
including the demographic, socioeconomic and past health 
services utilization.14 
The low utility from the rehabilitation and para-clinical 
services revealed in our findings might be related to the 
limited choices and low quality and quantity of the services 
available.43 These conditions, in turn, might have influenced 
the individuals’ preferences, and the cost coverage of the 
services. Other DCE related studies in high and low-income 
countries reported that the benefits of the services and the 
extent of the cost coverage had marked influence on the 
individuals’ choices.27,44,45 The uncertainty of whether to utilize 
the healthcare services or not and the CHEs related to the 
utilization of the services can also influence the individuals’ 
rationale decision in selecting the benefit packages.44 Our 
findings showed that the individuals’ desire for full coverage of 
the health benefits package even to the services not included 
in the insurance benefit packages, and equal premium to all 
approach is a known source of dissatisfaction.46
Despite the insignificant relationship between the 
participants with chronic health conditions and their 
preferences to most of the attributes analyzed, there was 
a significantly higher preference for the long-term care 
benefit packages. Besides, those participants with chronic 
conditions were older than healthy individuals. The chronic 
health conditions are among the main factors which affect 
preferences.47,48 Individual’s health status and purchasing 
of health insurance are inversely related and can, in turn, 
affect the health benefits packages utilization. Also, healthy 
individuals usually purchase more private health benefits 
packages insurances than public ones. Again, evidence shows 
that despite the complementary and voluntary benefits 
packages, health insurance purchasing may not be affected 
by an individual’s health risks.49 In contrast, risk-averse 
individuals seek to get utility by purchasing health insurance 
to avoid the consequences of the risks.50 A person with poor 
health condition, especially among the self-employed, is 
more likely to experience financial problems and challenges 
to purchase health insurance.51 Thus, securing insurance for 
the health benefits packages from the public sector can help 
protect the poor against CHEs and improve health outcomes.52 
This study attempted to investigate the health insurance 
preferences of insured people in Iran. The findings provided 
useful information for health policy-makers and HIOs to 
better understand and improve the design of the existing 
health insurance plans in the context. However, the analysis 
focused on conveniently obtained data of a limited geographic 
area. Thus, our findings necessitate cautious interpretations. 
With this assumption that previous evidence and experts 
can reflect the opinions of insured people about attributes of 
health insurance, we excluded them from the first phase of 
the study. 
Conclusion
The findings revealed that the participants tended to 
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choose health insurance plans with higher cost coverage for 
healthcare services and with lower premiums. However, the 
individuals’ health insurance preferences were subject to the 
influences of the demographic characteristics, income, and 
health status. The findings are believed to contribute to the 
designing of better health insurance policies in the context 
of Iran, improve the participation of the citizens in health 
insurance, and increase the utility of the insured from the 
insurance benefits packages.
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